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This article examines Heidegger’s reading of Ernst Jünger’s 1932 Der Arbeiter by
making appeal not only to Heidegger’s remarks on the work (and its associated
text “Die totale Mobilmachung”) scattered in various texts, but by concentrating
on Heidegger’s now-available seminar notes and marginal notes to his actual
copy of the text. Heidegger held two seminars on Der Arbeiter, one shortly after
its publication and one in 1938, which show his close confrontation not only with
Jünger’s reading of Nietzsche, but also Heidegger’s own Nietzsche examination.
The article shows how Heidegger distinguishes himself from Jünger by, on the
one hand, seeing Der Arbeiter as very much a product of its time and, on the
other, identifying a prescience in Nietzsche of a Europe and planetary pheno-
menon (globalisation) yet to come. This is accomplished in the naming of the
triad of Bolshevism, fascism (Nazism), and Americanism metaphysically as the
singularity of “world democracy”, and as an entirely nihilistic phenomenon. The
article therefore relates the confrontation of these two thinkers with the third
(Nietzsche) to issues of the demand for justice, democracy, and the will to power
in contemporary economic and political developments, as well as to wider
themes in Heidegger’s thought of the end (or consummation) of metaphysics, the
will to power, and valuation.
The event, in which a new form has announced itself, the form of the worker,
brings to expression a particular mankind, presents itself in relation to a master-
ing of the world as the emergence of a new principle, which should be defined
as work. (Jünger 1941, p. 85)2
1. This paper was first given for the Research Seminar in the Department of Organisation, Work and
Technology of Lancaster University Management School. I must here express my sincere gratitude to
Bogdan Costea and Martin Brigham for their generous invitation to offer this paper in January 2008,
for their hospitality, and above all for their profound thoughtfulness in provoking enquiry into these
research questions.
2. ‘Der Vorgang, in dem sich eine neue Gestalt, die Gestalt des Arbeiters, in einem besonderen
Menschentum zum Ausdruck bringt, stellt sich in bezug auf die Meisterung der Welt dar als das
Auftreten eines neuen Prinzips, das als Arbeit bezeichnet werden soll.’ All translations are my own.
The first edition of Der Arbeiter, as with the earlier text ‘Die totale Mobilmachung’ (1930), was
published in Sütterlin script, which allowed for no italicisation. In later (standard type) editions,
Jünger reworked the texts, adding emphases, which I have always indicated in the English, but not





























With these words the German intellectual Ernst Jünger opened the second
section of his book Der Arbeiter: Herrschaft und Gestalt (“The Worker: Dominion
and Form”), published in Hamburg in 1932, the year before Hitler and his Nazi
party took overall power in a Germany already for 14 years riven with political
and economic strife. The book, at times breathless, but couched in a high literary
style, was born directly of the turmoil of the period and sold (and was even read)
remarkably widely. The publishers boasted that in six days flat, “and even before
publication”3, over 5000 copies had left the press. In it, Jünger developed ideas
first discussed in a shorter essay of 1930, “Die totale Mobilmachung” (“Total
Mobilisation”; Jünger 1930), which advanced an analysis of what we would now
recognise under the title of globalisation. Born of reflection on the total mobili-
sation inherent in waging a world-scale war — at the time there had been only
one — it traced those forces of development which transform the wars of “feudal
lords, [then] of kings and bourgeois” to succeed them with “wars of workers –
wars for whose rational structure and of whose highest degree [mercilessness]
the first great confrontation of the twentieth century has been a presentiment”
(Jünger 1930, p. 16).4 The forces in play for Jünger in this period immediately
before the triumph of Nazism itself are worth noting. These political develop-
ments arise from, and transform, the nation-state and the means by which it
binds the individual to it: 
patriotism comes to be overtaken by a nationalism shot through with new, power-
ful elements of consciousness. In fascism, in Bolshevism, in Americanism, in
Zionism, in the movements of coloured peoples, advance is made into a progress
that would have been formerly unthinkable; in effect it performs a somersault,
in order to continue its movement on a very simple level after a circle or circular
movement of artificial dialectic. (Jünger 1930, p. 27)5
If patriotism arises on the basis of a subjectively felt belonging, nationalism could
be construed as the assimilation of subjects to the command of the state. I would
suggest that the whole of this article will dedicate itself to seeking out an under-
standing of what is indicated here by the meaning of Jünger’s use of sich über-
schlagen, as that which somersaults or jumps over itself, as a way of explaining
the essence of the age, both then, and indeed now.
We who are accustomed to the political thinking of the post-war period have
been taught to interpret all claims made in the name of the worker in an essentially
3.  Prospectus for Der Arbeiter (Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1932): ‘In sechs Tagen und noch vor
Erscheinen des Buches über 5,000 Stück verkauft!’
4.  ‘Und so kommt es, daß auf die Kriege der Ritter, der Könige und Bürger die Kriege der Arbeiter
folgen – Kriege, von deren rationeller Struktur und deren hohem Grade uns bereits die erste große
Auseinandersetzung des 20. Jahrhunderts eine Ahnung gegeben hat.’ Jünger later edited ‘hohem
Grade’ to read ‘Unbarmherzigkeit’ (see Jünger 1965a, p. 133).
5.  ‘Der Patriotismus wird durch einen modernen, stark mit Bewußtseinselementen durchsetzten
Nationalismus abgelöst. Im Faschismus, im Bolschewismus, im Amerikanismus, im Zionismus, in den
Bewegungen der farbigen Völker setzt der Fortschritt zu Vorstößen an, die man bisher für undenkbar
gehalten hätte; er überschlägt sich gleichsam, um nach einem Zirkel der künstlichen Dialektik seine
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Marxist register: whether that Marxism takes the now-discredited form of Soviet-
era dictatorship, or softer, more acceptable forms to be found in the increasingly
humanistic pronouncements of figures like Jürgen Habermas or even contempo-
raneously in the idiosyncratically refurbished demagoguery of Slavoj [Zcaron] i[zcaron] ek and
Ernesto Laclau.
Jünger is normally interpreted as a figure of the right in the contrapuntal
understanding of politics that defined the post-war period through “left” and
“right”, but in this article I want to eschew that differentiation (who, in the
midst of the current somersaults of Western social democracy, can tell me what
this differentiation still really means?) for the sake of opening the way (and in
this brief article we can do no more than that) to a more genuine interpretation
of the politics and history of the twentieth, and indeed twenty-first, centuries.
What Jünger celebrates and revels in with his typus of the worker has a critique,
which I also want to raise, for the sake of enabling us to gain a foothold in the
understanding of our own contemporary political situation — thoughtful interpre-
tations of which seem to be shadowy and rare, at least in the public spaces of
media-driven discourse. I want to emphasise at this point that I speak not as a
political scientist, nor with any pretensions to be one. I am uninterested in the
technique for analytical dissection of the body politic, precisely because it is
technique. The philosopher is one who seeks to engage with the self-understand-
ing of political being — ta ethike politike, as Aristotle calls it — in the being of
being human. We get on with the business (and it is a business) of political life
with little interest in the self-explanation of that life. We take for granted a
certain kind of political being to a higher degree than would be true at any other
time in the last 500 years, let alone 5000, where politics is, if it is anything at
all, the passion and pursuit of particularities and special interests. What the
consequences of this are, are yet to be explored. Every announced political
slogan or solution — from contemporary nebulous claims to change for its own
sake to the endless requirement for “radical reform” — arrives as a kind of
political kitsch.
Jünger was, in the best sense of the words, a literary warmonger. Born in 1895,
he died only in 1998, five weeks short of his one-hundred-and-third birthday, and
two years after being received into the Catholic Church. Awarded the highest
level of military decoration at the age of only 23, the Pour le Mérite or “Blue
Max”, for his service in the First World War (already holding the Iron Cross First
Class), he served again in the second conflagration, though with less distinction.
Courted and at the same time despised by the Nazis, he never joined them (he
was at one point in 1938 forbidden to write or publish), and was very tangentially
involved in the von Stauffenberg plot to murder Hitler. His son Ernst was subse-
quently murdered at Nazi hands in a penal camp in Italy after accusations of
subversion (during service in the German navy), at least possibly in reprisal.
Jünger’s literary outpouring is immense, and he lived to see not one but two
collected editions of his works (Jünger 1965b, 1983).
By examining one or two aspects of that typus which Jünger identifies as the






























movements of the last 100 years and show its metaphysical character. I want to
do this in relation to Jünger’s chosen interlocutor, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the
critique and questioning that both Jünger and Nietzsche have been put to by the
interlocutor who sought Jünger out and befriended him, Martin Heidegger. Perhaps
we might thereby gain a glimpse of Heidegger’s own political engagement. If Jünger
never joined the Nazi Party, Heidegger never left it, joining in 1933 (only once
the Nazis had taken power). If Jünger never publicly criticised the Nazi Party, he
nevertheless took them on, refusing to contribute to Nazi newspapers, and refusing
chairs, honours, and other appointments. He was at least somewhat susceptible
to the biological racism of the age, and he is to be found describing Jews as a
threat to the unity of the German state in 1930 (cf. Jünger 2001). We are bound
to concede his anti-Semitism was different in character to that of the Nazis,
however unsavoury we find it now to have to cut such distinctions. Heidegger (not
above the odd anti-Semitic aside himself, but not a biological racist) was as much
a public critic of the Nazis as he dared to be in his lectures, although in ways that
are still difficult to understand and see: Heidegger’s supposed “silence” is shrill
and prescient if you know where, and how, to cock your ear.
Heidegger became intrigued by Jünger’s work after the publication of “Die
totale Mobilmachung” and he refers in several places to discussions he organised
on Jünger’s Der Arbeiter both shortly after its publication (with Heidegger’s Assis-
tent Werner Brock and a small circle) and again in 1939/1940 (Heidegger 2000a;
cf. Heidegger 2000b, p. 375), until, he says, “one was, however, not surprised
that an attempt to elucidate ‘Der Arbeiter’ was watched and finally forbidden”
(Heidegger 1996, p. 390).6 This remark was itself made in the context of
Heidegger’s final confrontation with Jünger, in the 1956 version of his essay “Zur
Seinsfrage” (“On the Question of Being”), which had first appeared in 1955 under
the title Über “die Linie” (“Concerning ‘The Line’”; Heidegger 1955; cf.
Heidegger 1996). This was a clever pun and a modification of Jünger’s own title
for a contribution to a Festschrift for Heidegger five years earlier, on the occasion
of his sixtieth birthday: “Über die Linie” (“Crossing the Line”; Jünger 1965c).
Heidegger’s mischievous modification of the title transforms the meaning from
“crossing the line”, by which Jünger had meant crossing over from nihilism to the
thinking of being, to “concerning ‘the line’”, and indicating that the “crossing”
in question can never be a conscious decision, never an act of the willing subject.7
Jünger’s essay “Über die Linie” begins by citing the very opening of the work
that underpins the relation between the two thinkers, the problematic and ficti-
tious Wille zur Macht (“Will to Power”), put together by editors appointed by
Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche from her brother’s notebooks (Jünger 1965c,
p. 247).8 Heidegger was well aware that the work was bastard scholarship;
Jünger seems for a long time to have taken it as a genuine work of Nietzsche’s.
We must take care here: inasmuch as Wille zur Macht is not a genuine work of
6.  ‘Man war aber nicht überrascht, daß ein Versuch, den “Arbeiter” zu erläutern, überwacht und
schließlich unterbunden wurde.’
7.  For a discussion of this transformation in the titles, see Sheehan (1998, esp. pp. 276–277).
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Nietzsche’s, it nevertheless contains Nietzsche’s genuine work. In 1950, Jünger
can only have been aware by report and through conversation of Heidegger’s
extensive and profound confrontation with Nietzsche, in lectures and seminars
stretching from 1937 until he ceased lecturing in 1944, but in notes, discussions,
and other engagements right up until 1950.9 The first fruits of this engagement
were published by Heidegger only in 1961, and the full extent has leaked out
more slowly in successive volumes of Heidegger’s collected works, until the last
appeared in 2004. It is worth noting, as we shall be referring to them, that
Heidegger’s notes on Jünger and his marginal notes to his own copy of Der
Arbeiter also finally appeared in 2004 (Heidegger 2004b). It is only now, in other
words, that we have the scholarly means to understand the relationships in this
triad of Nietzsche, Jünger, and Heidegger.
But it is only now that the question emerges at all, as we dwell within a trium-
phant third and final phase, that of “world democracy”, first described by both
Heidegger and Jünger in various texts as “Americanism”. For Heidegger,
Americanism is at one and the same time the “dreariest” viewpoint of those who
think that “the true is what produces results” (Heidegger 1992a, pp. 54–55)10,
and metaphysically like the outlook of (Bolshevik) Russia, in the grip of “the same
hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and rootless organisation of the average
man” (Heidegger 1983, pp. 40–41; cf. pp. 48–49).11 Heidegger’s marginal note to
an early part of the discussion in Der Arbeiter, dealing with Jünger’s description
of the essential bourgeois drive for “security” (Sicherheit), makes clear that this
bourgeois drive is in its essence “Americanism” (Heidegger 2004b, p. 329).
Throughout his last public engagement with Jünger in “Zur Seinsfrage”, Heidegger
names all of this — fascism, Marxism, Americanism or world democracy — as the
“movement of nihilism” (Bewegung des Nihilismus). And it is a single movement
of nihilism that is at issue, despite its fragmentation into multiple political forms.
For Jünger, total mobilisation is above all a 
measure of organisatory thinking that is only an indication of that higher mobil-
isation which the time presses in on us. This mobilisation lives from its own inner
lawfulness with which human law, if it is to be effective, must run parallel to.
(Jünger 1930, p. 22)12
9.  The first fruits of this work appeared in print only in 1954, with the publication of Heidegger’s
essay ‘Wer ist Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?’ in the essay collection Vorträge und Aufsätze (Heidegger
1954, pp. 97–122; cf. Heidegger 2000e, pp. 99–124). The two volumes of extracts from Heidegger’s
lectures on Nietzsche did not appear until 1961 (cf. Heidegger 1997a, b) and were first published by
Günther Neske. The full texts of the lecture courses and discussions on which these were based
were published in volumes 43–44, 46–48 and 50 of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe (Heidegger 1985,
1986a, 1986b, 1989, 1990, 2003).
10.  ‘Wir sind längst in den ödesten Amerikanismus abgerutscht, nach dessen Grundsatz das wahr
ist, was Erfolg hat.’
11.  ‘dieselbe trostlose Raserei der entfesselten Technik und der bodenlosen Organisation des
Normalmenschen.’
12.  ‘Die Totale Mobilmachung als Maßnahme des organisatorischen Denkens ist nur eine Andeutung
jener höheren Mobilmachung, die die Zeit an uns vollzieht. Dieser Mobilmachung wohnt eine eigene
Gesetzmäßigkeit inne, mit der das menschliche Gesetz, wenn es wirksam sein soll, parallel laufen





























Jünger saw in the First World War the working out of a transition, from the
limited forms of mobilisation of early forms of political organisation, culminating
in monarchy and bourgeois democracy, to the total and constant transformation
of all political forms in the securing of the will to power.
To understand why Jünger is so far in advance even of that understanding of
politics which is essentially revolutionary (even in its most reactionary form, in
Stalinism), one must turn to his interlocutor Martin Heidegger. For Heidegger
exposes the essential Hegelianism of Marxism quite sharply in a television inter-
view he conducted with Richard Wisser in 1969. Wisser opened the interview by
confronting Heidegger with the question of the demands for social change which
in 1969 (and so in the wake of 1968) were sweeping through Germany, France,
and to a lesser extent Britain. To Wisser’s question, Heidegger replied: “We must
first ask: ‘What is Society?’ and we have to consider that today’s society is only
the absolutising of modern subjectivity” (Heidegger 2000c, p. 703).13 He contin-
ued, citing Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach: 
“Philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; what matters is to
change it.” When this statement is cited and when it is followed, it is overlooked
that changing the world presupposes a change in the representation of the
world. A representation of the world can only be won by adequately interpreting
the world. (Heidegger 2000c, p. 703)14
Heidegger points out that the anticipated revolution has already occurred as a
representational thought for those committed to revolution: in this, the Marxist
conception of the world is itself overtaken by total mobilisation even before a
single revolutionary event has occurred or a shot fired. We may add that the
Marxist struggle above all, and its struggle with fissiparation on the left and
retreat into nationalism on the right (fissiparation, in other words, is if you each
can claim from each of your national seats to be sole true representative of the
international), is to coordinate this transformation to a common, willed horizon
(the essentially Hegelian aspect), and the inevitable and constant collapse into
failure of that project. What Heidegger meant by this should, I hope, be clearer
by the end of this article.
Jünger also delineates the political possibilities of our own connection to the
history of the last 100 years as “fascism”, “Bolshevism” and “Americanism” (see
earlier quote on p. 232). Heidegger later explains the connection between these
terms in a manner more familiar to contemporary ears by saying: 
13.  ‘Wenn man diese Frage beantworten will, muß man zuerst fragen: “Was ist Gesellschaft?” und
muß darüber nachdenken, daß die heutige Gesellschaft nur die Verabsolutierung der modernen
Subjektivität ist’ (emphasis in original).
14.  ‘”Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kömmt darauf an, sie zu
verändern.” Bei der Zitation dieses Satzes und bei der Befolgung dieses Satzes übersieht man, daß
eine Weltveränderung eine Änderung der Weltvorstellung voraussetzt und daß eine Weltvorstellung




























HEIDEGGER AND JÜNGER’S DER ARBEITER 237
In the winter of 1939/40, I once again discussed parts of Jünger’s book Der
Arbeiter with a circle of colleagues; I learned that these ideas still seemed
strange and disconcerting even then, until they were verified by “the facts”.
What Ernst Jünger means by his idea of the rule and figure of the worker and
what he sees in the light of this idea is the universal rule of the will to power
within planetary history. Today everything is part of this reality, whether it is
called communism, or fascism, or world democracy. (Heidegger 2000b, p. 375)15
The discussions he refers to here are precisely those that Heidegger said had
been shut down by the Nazis, a foreclosure whose meaning he explained by
saying: “For it belongs to the essence of the will to power that the reality which
it powers-up and produces is not allowed to appear as that reality which it itself
brings to be” (Heidegger 1996, p. 390).16 To all movement of nihilism belongs an
essential hiding and covering up, precisely in the manner in which it eventuates
what it effects. And here we should remind ourselves of the fourth and fifth of
Jünger’s list of political forms: Zionism and the movements of coloured peoples.
These are names that, once unsurprising, now have the power to embarrass us,
and as embarrassments, precisely illustrate the capacity and force of the move-
ment of nihilism to render certain kinds of political phenomena only through
silence. Add to this the apparent political silence of the young, supposedly
“alienated” from traditional politics in the West, but perhaps better explained
by nothing other than somnambulance in lands of plenty in which no particular
political demands need take shape because political aspiration has been
exchanged for consumption. We see, perhaps, how the movement of nihilism
enforces even now — in the midst of democracy — silence concerning the real
character of political being, in the being of being human.
In his seminar group, Heidegger summed up his assessment of Der Arbeiter: 
It achieves what all Nietzsche literature was not able to achieve so far, namely
to communicate an experience of being and as such how it is, in the light of
Nietzsche’s outline of beings mediated as will to power. (Heidegger 1996, p. 390)17
To explain political democracy as arising on the same metaphysical basis as
communism and fascism is a bold claim, and an uncomfortable one. This claim
can only be understood through Jünger’s explication of the metaphysical typus
of the worker, a type that Heidegger believed had its origins in Nietzsche’s
thought (cf. Heidegger 1992b, p. 204).
15.  ‘Im Winter 1939/40 habe ich dann noch einmal mit einem Kreis von Kollegen Jüngers Buch “Der
Arbeiter” teilweise durchgesprochen und erfahren, wie damals noch diese Gedanken fremd waren und
noch befremdeten, bis sie durch “die Tatsachen” bestätigt werden. Was Ernst Jünger in den Gedanken
von Herrschaft und Gestalt des Arbeiters denkt und im Licht dieses Gedanken sieht, ist die universale
Herrschaft des Willens zur Macht innerhalb der planetarisch gesehenen Geschichte. In dieser
Wirklichkeit steht heute Alles, mag es Kommunismus heißen oder Faschismus oder Weltdemokratie.’
16.  ‘Denn es gehört zum Wesen des Willens zur Macht, das Wirkliche, das er be-mächtigt, nicht in
der Wirklichkeit erscheinen zu lassen, als welche er selber west.’
17.  ‘Das leistet, was bisher alle Nietzsche-Literatur nicht vermochte, nämlich eine Erfahrung des






























How are we to hear Heidegger’s claim that “today’s society is only the abso-
lutising of modern subjectivity”? For if we can understand this, we may be able
to understand what is at issue in the claim that there is a metaphysical unity to
the political forms that occur in the unfolding of the very process and fact of
“planetary” globalisation, and therefore we can find out how to read Der Arbe-
iter. We have to hear in Heidegger’s use of the term “absolutising” (Verabsoluti-
erung) the continual transforming character of Jünger’s description of total
mobilisation. Jünger himself says “that the worker is to be grasped as the subject
of this transforming” — both as the one who as subject effects the transforming
and as the one who is the subject produced through and by it (Jünger 1941,
p. 85).18 In his notes on Der Arbeiter, Heidegger several times indicates that the
understanding of representation at work in the notion of the typus of the worker
is fundamentally described by the seventeenth-century metaphysician Leibniz
(cf. Heidegger 2004b, pp. 106, 167). The burden of Heidegger’s interpretation
turns on the ambiguity in German of the verb vorstellen, which means at once
“to represent” as in “think” (in the sense of ego cogito, and exactly in that sense)
and “to place before”, vor-stellen, “re-present”. In his considerations of Jünger,
Heidegger notes that for Leibniz 
Repræsentatio, however, is re-presentation in the double sense of bringing to the
fore, making-present, and thus the brought-forth itself. For example, Leibniz’s
concept of repræsentatio (he represents, “represents something”, is somebody).
The singular (Monad) 1. point of view, mirror of the universal; 2. thereby ousia,
substantia. (Heidegger 2004b, p. 167)19
To clarify what is at issue we need to make a brief detour into how the subject
of subjectivity is established. For Heidegger, all philosophy, as metaphysics, has
depended (and especially since Descartes) on the reconciliation of the particular
subject with the universal (what establishes it and makes it possible — metaphys-
ically thought, its cause). Thus, the question is asked as to how this being here
indicates being in general. The assertion cogito, ergo sum does no more or less
than this in a particular way (hence why it is infinitely more important to
Descartes to demonstrate the cause of the subject than to explicate the
subject’s being in the world) — it says that each subject, each individuum, is
nevertheless potentially every other, it is potentially the same as any other. In
18.  ‘daß der Arbeiter als das Subjekt dieser Veränderung zu begreifen ist’.
19.  ‘Repræsentatio aber ist Vor-stellen im doppelten Sinne von Vor-bringen, Anwesendmachen und
so das Vorgebrachte selbst. Vgl. Leibniz’ Begriff der repræsentatio – (er repräsentiert, “stellt etwas
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this sense, the cogito, ergo sum discloses the universal id est, the “all” that
manifests in “each” particular case.20
The subject is the “mathematical” moment in modern thinking — where
mathesis means not “dealing with numbers” but rather “in anything that I know,
what I can take as already known with respect to it”. Jünger says in Der Arbeiter
that the new “face of the earth” which he seeks to describe is brought about by
the worker as the bearer of the coldest, most terrible consciousness, such that
“here the lines of the emotional and the mathematical intersect” (Jünger 1941,
p. 58).21 Heidegger’s marginal note to this reads “homo: animal rationale! Qua
subiectum” (Heidegger 2004b, p. 335; emphasis in original).
Numbers are mathematical because in every instance of a number, what is
numbered is known only subsequent to my (prior) knowledge of the number
itself. In seeing three chairs, I already “know” the three, before I even need
know what the three is “of” — i.e. chairs. In this, the “mathematical” being of
the cogito is always represented first, i.e. mathematically — it is what I know
before I know anything else; it is the prior representation on which every other
subsequent thing to be known is at the same time secured and grounded. Thus,
the represented is what is thought in every thought (Kant calls it the Inbegriff,
the “inner concept” of every particular concept in both the first and the third
Critiques — cf. Kant 1990, §79, p. 283; 1974, A572/B600, p. 515).
In subjectivity, representation takes place in some moment prior to being, the
(ideal) moment from out of which the subject always retains its absolute being
independently of the world. The subject “enters” a world from which it already
considers itself to be (mathematically) separate in order to secure whatever it
will know from the world. This moment is the moment attained to by Descartes,
where the subject retains its being independently of the world — where the
cogito, having eradicated every trace of the world through the method of doubt,
cannot eradicate itself. As the ineradicable self-evidence, it represents itself to
itself as the one thing it can secure itself through, prior to every occasion of
actual being (the very means by which the “ought” and “should be” overtake
whatever is). Representation — Vorstellung — always places the human subject
in advance of actual being, ahead of it, so that everything it knows, it knows
through what it already knows. Knowledge is reduced to the mathemata, the
things known by being already known.
A peculiar feature of Descartes’ description of the subjectivity of the subject
— the cogito — is that he at no point makes any reference to, or shows the
slightest interest in, social relations. Descartes takes no interest even in specific
20.  The critical issue is not that the est and the sum are said as an identity, but in what order or
taxis the est and the sum are ordered one to the other. In the ancient ontology, the est always
precedes the sum, such that “world” is always given in advance of the self, and the self is under-
stood only as that which is “taken off” from the unity of the world (this is how Aristotle’s sophia as
the arche of the hen is understood); for Descartes and all subjectival thinking following him, the
self is always understood as represented prior to and in advance of everything that is, such that its
prior existence is encountered only subsequently to, and as a mere property of, its actuality.





























questions of alterity — that there are, or might be, other subjects. The subjec-
tivity of the subject is secured with reference to no social underpinnings
whatsoever. This does not mean that there are no social consequences arising
from the assertion cogito, ergo sum. It does mean, however, that no social rela-
tions are self-consciously entailed or required for the sake of the demonstration
of the self-evidence cogito, ergo sum: the assertion takes place on the basis of a
self-concealment of the social relations which already make it possible. We can
no more than indicate that this is again the very basis for the capacity and in fact
activity of nihilism to hide and conceal the very means by which it effects what
it eventuates.
Overall, this “problem” of the social relations of subjectivity proceeds in one
direction with Husserl, Buber, and Lévinas, in the elucidation of “intersubjec-
tivity” — the constructive securing of the subjectivity of an other through the
subjectivity of the same. This, however, is only a very dependent and deriva-
tive resolution that arises out of the decay of the notion of substance, substan-
tia, ousia. Leibniz’s is the more important solution, which also takes for
granted, but does not make explicit, that the securing of the subject is only
possible on the basis that the subject is already one among many subjects. The
transformation worked here is difficult to see, but cannot be overestimated in
its importance.
Inasmuch as Aristotle speaks of the human being as zoon politikon, Aristo-
tle takes for granted that each individual human being both is with respect
to the whole and is “uniquely”. He describes this by understanding the politi-
cal through the essential differences that disclose the placedness of place.
Put simply, in Aristotle’s cosmos, every place is unique — no two places in
the cosmos are the same. Thus, every place in the cosmos is both determin-
able relatively — I am to the left of him and the right of her — and abso-
lutely — I am “up” with regard to the earth or floor, and “down” with
respect to the heavens. The fundamental presupposition here is that the
cosmos is finite — there is only one world and it is not infinite. Because place
(topos) is an ontological determination and not a spatial one (Aristotle knew
nothing of “space”), social place — my social place in the polis — is deter-
mined in exactly the same way as (and so not even analogously to) my physi-
cal place. Rather, therefore, the social and political determination of place
is the same as what we now call the spatial and all of these are ontological
determinations, at the same time as being absolute. My unique particularity
(ousia, as substance, but connected with monas, as the singular point, the
single “place” that “I” “am”) is worked out (by means of the causes, in each
case) through uncovering who, and this here means what, I already am. My
being — social, political, and spatial — is utterly derived from my “where”
and “wherein” (pos) in the world, and not from any other (ideal, abstracted)
place. In this, Aristotle only makes thematic what is already present and
operative for the Greeks (although Plato’s understanding of politics is alto-
gether more strange and complex, in ways that do not concern us here).
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what lets me be seen for who I am, and uniquely so. No one else can occupy
my place.22
By the time of Leibniz, everything is different. The underpinning of ousia,
“substance”, is now no longer what I already am with respect to what I myself
have to work out, but rather how God has disposed me to be, what God has
decided for me. In this, one can see already how I am worked out from a willing,
though no willing of my own, but the will of God. That who I am is decided from
a place willed for me, and prepared in advance, which then “disposes me to be”,
is already the way in which (my particular) being and being in general are
conflated with willing, through no will of my own (what God wills and what is are
or ought to be the same). Inasmuch as I appear, I make present my “with respect
to the whole” — but now my physical and social place makes visible what God has
disposed for me, willed for me to be. A further transformation has been worked,
however — inasmuch as for Aristotle, every social, political, and spatial place is
unique, it also has a binding character, it cannot be changed (this is Aristotle’s
philosophical indebtedness to what is “fated” and so disposed for each and every
one), and inasmuch as it does change, it is a transformation of the cosmos itself.
For Leibniz, however, the consequence of the cogito is that every subject is,
if not in actuality then potentially, identical. Put simply, for Aristotle, every
place, every “point in space” is unique. For Leibniz, every “point” (as a “one”),
each monad is “really” the same as and identical with every other. This means
that social and political differentiation are, for Aristotle, established by the
place character of place and, for Leibniz, by God. God wills it that I am different
to you: my difference to you is not a necessary condition of our being together
in the same cosmos.
Aristotle’s understanding of place is established through the opposite of mobil-
isation — in fact, through absolute stability. The absolutely stable is at one and
the same time the true. Social differentiation appears, therefore, in how the
truth is spoken (i.e. “who” speaks the truth). In the sixth book of the Nicoma-
chean Ethics, the various modes of “speaking truly” are worked out (techne,
episteme, phronesis and sophia). But, in each case, the truth that is spoken is
spoken by someone (techne by the technetes or architect; episteme by the scien-
tist; phronesis by the dicast or judge; sophia by the philosopher). The way in
which you relate to the one stable character of the truth of the true will be
revealed by what you say and how you say it with respect to what it is you speak
of and it will tell me who you are, your “place”. Truth and place are disclosed
by logos in each case — not by what you want or are driven to say, but by what
it is you already “have” to say.
The social consequences of the substantiality of substance are that every
(social as much as physical) place is and remains absolutely differentiated with
respect to every other. Every particular place is and always is different and
22.  Understood like this, a clone of me exactly reinforces my uniqueness, for an identical copy cannot
occupy the same place as mine. Our identicality would be precisely visible because the identical would





























differentiated from every other. This does not mean I cannot ever change place,
but it does mean that insofar as I can and do change place, I will move from one
unique place to another unique place. Places, even in the plural, always and only
indicate the singularity of place. Change of place is not mobilisation: in every
change of place, something remains unmoved — motion is only visible through a
prior (or more basic) stasis. For Leibniz, in that every place is actually different,
but potentially the same, the potentiality for mobilisation for its own sake has
made itself present: mobilisation is an at least potential possibility, actualised
by the will of God, or by God’s analogue, the monarch. The static is only visible
when there is motion: motion brings the stability of stasis into view.
If God is dead, then the consequences of this are that total mobilisation
becomes not just possible, but required, both to make visible the death of God
and God’s analogue, the monarch (and insofar as an analogue has made itself
present, a split has opened up), and to become visible as an individual at all.
Moreover, the will to power fulfils the will of God by replacing it. “God” as
“being in general” is now understood as, and through, work: the working out and
working up of the real. The indeterminate “substance” of the subjectivity of the
subject must both actualise and attain its stability through its capacity for mobil-
isation. It is for this reason that the understanding of total mobilisation precedes
the figure of the worker as its condition. Total mobilisation is the social and polit-
ical manifestation of the will to power. Will to power here must be understood
as a condition of being, not as what any individual subject wills. Subjects “will”
only because every being (subject) only becomes visible through the will to
power, and not the other way around. Jünger says: 
work is the tempo of the fist, of the thoughts, of the heart, of life itself by day
and night, science, love, art, faith, piety, war; work is the oscillating of atoms
and the power by which stars and solar systems move. (Jünger 1941, p. 65)23
Heidegger notes in the margin: “work equals the beingness of being in general
(metaphysics)” (Heidegger 2004b, p. 341)24, which, we should note, is Heidegger’s
understanding of the metaphysical name of God.25
Heidegger’s suggestion that this replicates Leibniz’s understanding of the
speculum universi, the “mirror of the universal”, the single vantage point that is
God, is because God knows all there is to know, so that when anything is known
by the subject, the subject only knows now what God knew already. This essen-
tially monarchial viewpoint is, however, overthrown in the death of God such
that the subject does not replicate the social relations proper to monarchy,
whereby the individual represents socially in each case the stable, permanent
23.  ‘Arbeit ist das Tempo der Faust, der Gedanken, des Herzens, das Leben bei Tage und Nacht, die
Wissenschaft, die Liebe, die Kunst, der Glaube, der Kultus, der Krieg; Arbeit ist die Schwingung des
Atoms und die Kraft, die Sterne und Sonnensysteme bewegt.’
24.  ‘A[rbeit] = Seiendheit des Seienden i. G. (Metaphysik).’
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presence of the divine mind. Now the subject represents (in the social sphere)
what precisely?
Before we answer this question, it should now be clear why the type of the
worker is counterposed to the type of the feudal lord, the king, the bourgeois:
the worker is that one best able to take command of the means of total mobili-
sation and, at the same time, the worker is that one produced by the means of
total mobilisation. The worker is the “product” of technology and of technique,
and work is the making manifest of the will to power. Jünger says that “means
and the powers of life become possible”, which means “become the same”
(Jünger 1941, p. 58).26 Put this way, the worker does not work, rather work
makes of (wirkt! — “makes real!”) the worker the work that he is. Nietzsche
speaks of how “the subject alone is demonstrable: hypothesis, that there is only
the subject — that ‘object’ is only a manner of subject working upon subject —
a mode of the subject” (Nietzsche 1996, §569, p. 388).27
Jünger’s language in Der Arbeiter exhibits a sheer energy which itself reflects
the drive into power that characterises the age of extreme nihilism. Here we
must make a further point. It has become typical of the rhetoric of a certain kind
of contemporary social conservative to decry and denounce nihilism as if it were
itself something to be striven to overcome. Thus, we can disdain Marxism, or
Nazism, or Jünger, the — if not Nazi — political rightist that he undoubtedly was,
as mere decline, amorality, and decay. In this critique (of whom Spengler is the
apostle), everything is in decline, and goes steadily off to the dogs.28 Whether
things go to the dogs or not is irrelevant and matters not a whit. Our task here is
to describe, to bring to language, what nihilism is and what as a singular move-
ment is constantly moved within it. Nihilism is not the dissipation of everything,
nor is it the collapse into the immoral — quite the reverse. In nihilism, the great-
est and most vigorous moralising drive appears: we should note that terrorists
claim to act from moral purposes. Nihilism is never the triviality of mere anarchy,
it is not the abolition of power, but the drive into the highest power. Even the
anarchist does not seek the destruction of power, but seeks only the destruction
of everything that would take power over him.
26.  ‘daß so eine ungeahnte und noch unerprobte gegenseitige Steigerung der Mittel und Mächte des
Lebens möglich wird’
27.  ‘Das Subjekt allein ist beweisbar: Hypothese, daß es nur Subjekte giebt – daß “Objekt” nur eine
Art Wirkung von Subjekt auf Subjekt ist … ein modus des Subjekts’ (emphases in original).
28.  Heidegger dismisses Spengler with respect to Jünger with the delicious, if haughty, epithet of
‘Prussian socialism’ (Preußischer Sozialismus), a reference to an expression of Spengler’s and a work
of the same name by Schinkel (1934; cf. Heidegger 2004b, p. 343, as a marginal note to Jünger
1941, p. 66). Heidegger characterises Spengler’s understanding of decline as: ‘Spengler thinks
history, if he thinks at all, in a history-less way. He understands “decline” in the sense of mere
coming to an end, i.e. as biologically represented perishing. Animals “decline”, inasmuch as they
perish. History declines insofar as it falls back into the concealedness of the beginning’ (‘Spengler
denkt, wenn er überhaupt denkt, die Geschichte geschichtslos. Er versteht “Untergang” im Sinne
des bloßen Zuendegehens, d. h. als biologisch vorgestellte Verendung. Tiere “gehen unter”, indem
sie verenden. Geschichte geht unter, sofern sie in die Verborgenheit des Anfangs zurückgeht’)





























In the protocols from a seminar session of 1937 on Nietzsche’s Wille zur Macht
entitled “The Biological as Economic Basic-Position”, Heidegger notes that “the
opposite of what the common herd desire is necessary for the elevating of the
typical man” (Heidegger 2004a, §53, p. 66).29 The typical man is in every case
the subject as subject, who distinguishes himself in his very self precisely with
respect to, and over against, what he perceives to be what the common lot seek
out and seek after. We may note in passing that on this account, the typical man
is precisely a cultural conservative critic, bemoaning where the common lot are
driving themselves off to — but even more, that this reads like a manifesto for a
television or magazine advertisement for a luxury good, of the kind you would
find in the “How To Spend It” section of the weekend edition of the Financial
Times. The quality, character, and provenance of the luxury item in themselves
are of no relevance at all, only that in my possessing it I have something which
you could never have, and that it is the very opposite of what you already have.
The drive to be highest, best, above the herd is experienced not as the assertion
of a present (but yet unseen) state, but as a lack, something missing in the
subject which is to be attained and, as willed to be made to appear, thereby will
be made to appear. Repeatedly, Heidegger speaks of Jünger’s descriptions in Der
Arbeiter as the drive for security, for securing the indeterminate self over
against its indeterminacy. This “securing over against” is to be attained, for the
worker, by technological means, the absolute drive to put to work “the mechan-
ical and the organic” (cf. Heidegger 2004b, p. 96).30
In the notes for the same seminar session, Heidegger makes mention of
another fragment of Nietzsche’s, which he does not cite in full, but a sentence
of which exactly explains what is at issue: “the highest man will have the great-
est quantity of drives” (Nietzsche 1996, §966, p. 44). However, the drive-in to
power is itself counterposed by the arrival of the moral in a particular form. The
disdain of the cultural conservative is, in fact, a mere form of the more general
accompanying emotion that characterises all social distinction as it appears in
nihilism as such: anger. Inasmuch as I distinguish myself from you, and separate
myself out from you (while remaining essentially the same: indeterminate, a
worker-subject), I excite the demand for justice — for the levelling-off that can
only be resisted by the possession of a stock of power. This stock can be accumu-
lated money (or the power to access it, in the form of credit), but it can also be
29.  ‘Der Gegensatz aller Herden-Wünschbarkeit ist zur Erhöhung des Typus Mensch notwendig.’
30.  ‘Jünger sieht nicht, daß das Zeitalter des Arbeiters (das moderne Zeitalter) nur die äußerste
Fortsetzung und Vollendung der Neuzeit ist. Er sieht darin daß der “Arbeiter” die Herrschaft antritt,
eine neue Ordnung und neue Werte.
Aber “Werte” und “Gestalt” die höchste Form der Subjektivität. Allerdings aber eben der Subjektivität
mit allem, was sie umschließt: Sicherung, Planung, das Mechanische und das Organische und die
“Gestalt” d. h. die “Idea”’ (emphasis in original). Translated, this reads as follows:
‘Jünger does not see that the age of the worker (the modern age) is only the outermost  continuation
and completion of modernity. He sees only that the “Worker” initiates a new order and new values.
But “values” and “form” [are] the highest form of subjectivity. In all things, however, even subjec-
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the enforcement character of the state, or an appeal to law, and so forth. This
levelling-off is also the experience of a lack: of the drive and desire for justice
over against stocks of power, themselves posited above all by those who exer-
cise them in the very claim they make not to have them. Thus, the drive for
“justice for…” appears so often as a surprise to those deemed to be withholding
the justice in question: it seems to me almost all gender politics operates in this
way, especially in the processes of “self-identification”.
Jünger notes that “the pure will to power … is not riches, but the feeling of a
lack” (Jünger 1941, p. 71).31 Jünger adds in the text that this lack is countered
and overcome by Anstrengung, the “striving” of the subject, but Heidegger’s
marginal note to his copy of the text reads here: “this is a false interpretation of
the will to power – indeed the pure will is the highest form of the will, that is
justice” (Heidegger 2004b, p. 345).32 We find in the preparatory notes for
Heidegger’s seminar on Jünger the remark: “dominion [the subtitle of Der
Arbeiter] as the metaphysical essence of justice; this as ‘truth’ of the highest
will to power” (Heidegger 2004b, p. 172).33
Why is justice a higher form than the brute expression of power, asserted, we
might say, as the sheer drive to greed and self-attainment through (the triumph
of willed) self-assertion? Except that the essence of political nihilism is social, it
is essentially disclosed through the relations between subjects — and therefore
is not what I can take for myself but always what I can take with respect to you.
To say I self-identify as X means that in justice, you must accept me as the X that
I say I am. To take requires justification — what Jünger himself refers to as “legit-
imation” (see Jünger 1941, pp. 67–68, passim). It is far more powerful to secure
the indeterminacy of the subjectivity of the subject through justified differenti-
ation than through the unjustified. Any political programme which represents
itself as the correcting of injustice will appear as the most powerful (here we can
at least hear the “making correct” of the German term for justice, Gerechtigkeit).
It is not the essence of nihilism to collapse all to nothing, to establish every
thing that appears with merely nugatory value, a value without relativity
because universally set at nought. Rather, nihilism is itself the assumption that
every thing, already essentially valueless, or whose existing (“essential”) value
can in no way be justified, deferred to, or legitimated, calls forth and demands
devaluation for the sake of a revaluation. Every thing is to be ascribed a value all
over again. From where will the ascription of value come — for it cannot come
either from the essence or the place of a thing, and it cannot come from the
value assigned to it by God? Jünger comments that the contemporary situation,
the time of the worker, demands the establishment of a new form of power and
rule, which, inasmuch as it is a claim to freedom, is the claim of work. Work
produces the legitimation of power, of rule, and of freedom: “every claim to
31.  ‘Der reine Wille zur Macht … ist nicht die Fülle, sondern ein Gefühl des Mangels.’
32.  ‘das ist eine Fehlauslegung d[er] W[ille]z[ur]M[acht] gerade der reine W[ille] ist d. höchste
Form d[es] W[illens] = Gerechtigkeit.’






























freedom within the work-world is therefore only possible insofar as it appears as
a claim of work” (Jünger 1941, p. 65).34 Rule is, however, essentially ordering,
it is essentially what orders into hierarchy and distinction, and so difference as
such. The appearance of the worker as the form of the age (both the form the
age produces, and the form which is how the age is to be understood) transforms
the way in which hierarchy and distinction are to be understood. Heidegger’s
marginal comment to this passage about “claims” itself declaims: 
Law-laying! Rank-ordering! Nietzsche, where are the “rulers”? The ruler is — the
one who has the means to alter the will to power, and knows that it supplies a
courage, which requires neither brutality nor “heroism” in the contemporary
sense. (Heidegger 2004b, p. 341)35
The reference to heroism is without doubt to one of the slogans of the Hitlerists.36
Jünger described this fundamental transformation as a shift from bourgeois
forms to that of the worker as such: the bourgeois period was incapable of letting
the fundamentally determining form of the worker be seen (and so understood)
as an ordering form for the whole of “ideas, concepts or mere appearances” (Jünger
1941, p. 36).37 Heidegger’s marginal comments on this passage conclude that the
determining and rank-ordering are “to be understood therefore as metaphysical”,
which brings to the fore that “more decisive even than the worker is rank-ordering
itself as the jointure of beings” (Heidegger 2004b, p. 320).38 The emerging form
of the worker, as the decisive way in which all beings (ideas, concepts, appear-
ances, things) are set into relation one with another, means not that the (type
of the) worker himself is the decisive origin and apex of order, of arche as such,
but that the type of the worker both conceals (by taking over and assuming the
apex of ordering) and lets be seen rank-ordering, setting-into-relation, arche, as
such.
Heidegger derives this understanding from the unconditioned character of the
subject. The subject does not so much “value” in terms of assert itself and then
impose values on what it finds (thereby “choosing” the values it ascribes, rather
like Adam giving names to the subordinate creatures of Eden). Rather, the
34.  ‘Jeder Freiheitsanspruch innerhalb der Arbeitswelt ist also nur möglich, insofern er als Arbeit-
sanspruch erscheint.’
35.  ‘Gesetze-gebend! Rang-setzend! N[ietzsche] wo sind die “Herren”? Herr ist – wer das Wesen der
Macht zu wandeln vermag u. wissen kann, daß es eine Tapferkeit gibt, die weder der Brutalität noch
des “Heroismus” i. n. z. S. bedarf.’
36.  A Nazi Party propaganda poster in the series of ‘weekly exhortations’ (Wochenspruche) aimed
at the German public from the week of 29 September to 5 October 1940 proclaimed (as a quotation
from Hitler): ‘HEROISMUS ist nicht nur auf dem Schlachtfelde notwendig, sondern auch auf dem
Boden der Heimat’ (‘HEROISM is not only necessary on the battlefield, but also on the soil of the
homeland’) (capitalisation in original).
37.  ‘Ideen, Begriffen, oder bloßen Erscheinungen.’ The key sentence, however, is what precedes
this: ‘Den Arbeiter in einer durch die Gestalt bestimmten Rangordnung zu sehen’.
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unconditioned subject conditions itself through the values it ascribes — the
subject is also subject to (subjected by) the means and manners of valuation.
Here the fundamental difference between Heidegger and Jünger can also be
seen, one that even lets us glimpse Heidegger’s own political understanding, for
if Jünger is interested in bringing to description the typus of the worker and relat-
ing it to Nietzsche — the essence of the age — Heidegger himself is interested in
origination and the “jointure” of beings as such, what lets beings be seen both
for themselves and in relation to each other — what the Greeks name as arche,
ordering source, the essence of essence (das Wesen des Wesens). The difference
is in an ordering to time. Jünger is still preoccupied with the metaphysics of the
worker, its essence or “whatness” and its causes. When Jünger says of the type
of the worker that “one is forced to encounter a society of primitive souls, an
originating race, which has not yet discovered its historical task, and is thereby
free for new instructions” (Jünger 1941, p. 81)39, Heidegger’s marginal note adds:
“the futural, unconditioned, subject” (Heidegger 2004b, p. 354).40 What for
Jünger is an essence, a conditioning cause, is for Heidegger something yet to
come, something coming to presence and even only now arriving. The philosoph-
ical question here is: do causes predetermine or do they befall us from the future?
Depending on how we answer this will determine how we translate Jünger’s term
Urrasse (“primal race”, “original breed”, “new order”, “typus”?), emphasised by
being underlined in Heidegger’s own copy of the text.
Heidegger understood Jünger’s Der Arbeiter to be of its time — a verdict with
which Jünger would not have disagreed. Heidegger cautions that 
Jünger does not see that the age of the worker (the modern age) is only the latest
continuation and fulfilment of modernity. He sees that the dominion of the
“worker” sets out to begin a new order and new values. (Heidegger 2004b, p. 91)41
Even more critically, Heidegger says at one point that Jünger proceeds with noth-
ing other than the “implements” (literally, “table cutlery”) of Nietzsche’s meta-
physics (Heidegger 2004b, p. 338).42
It is this difference between Jünger and Heidegger which indicates most clearly
the different ways in which each interprets Nietzsche himself. Heidegger’s ques-
tion, “Nietzsche, where are the ‘rulers’?”, refers to the whole discussion in
Nietzsche of the character of rulership and command, Herrschaft, but reveals it
fundamentally to be asked as one not about the “metaphysical”, the “what”, the
essential “whatness character” of “what takes precedence over what” (and so
39.  ‘Hier wird man auf eine Gesellschaft primitiver Seelen stoßen, auf eine Urrasse, die noch nicht
als Subjekt einer historischen Aufgabe aufgetreten und daher frei für neue Aufträge ist.’ The under-
lining indicates words Heidegger underlined in his own copy of the text.
40.  ‘Das künftige unbedingte Subjekt’ (Heidegger’s underlining).
41.  ‘Jünger sieht nicht, daß das Zeitalter des Arbeiters (das moderne Zeitalter) nur die äußerste
Fortsetzung und Vollendung der Neuzeit ist. Er sieht darin daß der “Arbeiter” die Herrschaft antritt,
eine neue Ordnung und neue Werte.’
42.  ‘verfährt J. überall so, mit dem “Besteck” der Metaphysik Nietzsches.’ (‘Jünger generally





























what “causes” what) in the order of beings, the Greek manner of asking the
question about arche, as origination and rank-ordering as such; but about the non-
metaphysical manner in which there are those who make possible the making
manifest of beings. Nietzsche himself, in a passage edited into the Wille zur
Macht, says: 
from now on there will be more favourable preconditions for more comprehen-
sive forms of dominion, the like of which has never yet existed … a master race,
the future “rulers of the earth”, a new, uncanny aristocracy … a manner of higher
man who, thanks to his superiority in will, knowledge, riches and influence,
employs democratic Europe as the most pliant and supple device for getting hold
of the destinies of the earth … Enough: the time is coming when one will have to
be retrained for politics. (Nietzsche 1996, §960, p. 641)43
If the worker is typified in the forms of fascism (Nazism), communism (Bolshe-
vism), and Americanism, these are for Heidegger only the means by which the
underlying metaphysics of valuation eclipses what Jünger refers to as the latest
political forms (after the feudal, monarchial, and others). “World democracy” is
not, therefore, either for Heidegger or for Nietzsche, a final form, understood as
presence, but the manner of an overcoming, an emerging presencing, something
on its way and coming from before us. World democracy, as the triumph of some-
thing European (of which the American is only a later form) on a planetary scale
is attained through the metaphysics of valuation, which itself indicates the
arising triumph of the subjectivity of the subject. This emerging is essentially
“rank-ordering”: it does not cancel difference, it produces it in order to arrive
at all. The force of necessity cannot be overestimated: the subject, in order to
arrive and be visible, must and does arrive visibly (already) ascribing values.
It is for this reason that Heidegger appears to dismiss the propaganda forms of
Nazism, when, in the passage cited earlier, he says “[t]he ruler is — the one who
has the means to alter the will to power, and knows that it supplies a courage,
which requires neither brutality nor “heroism” in the contemporary sense”.44
The courage supplied will produce an aristocracy of those — of a “race” (we
might say “order”) — not yet seen, who will take command over the planet (will
globalise themselves), through the ever-transforming manner of the capacity to
43.  ‘Es wird von nun an günstige Vorbedingungen für umfänglichere Herrschafts-Gebilde geben,
deren Gleichen es noch nicht gegeben hat. Und dies ist noch nicht das Wichtigste; es ist die Entste-
hung von internationalen Geschlechts-Verbänden möglich gemacht, welche sich die Aufgabe setz-
ten, eine Herren-Rasse heraufzuzüchten, die zukünftigen “Herren der Erde”; – eine neue, ungeheure
… Aristokratie … eine höhere Art Menschen, die sich, dank ihrem Übergewicht von Wollen, Wissen,
Reichtum und Einfluß, des demokratischen Europas bedienen als ihres gefügigsten und beweglichs-
ten Werkzeugs, um die Schicksale der Erde in die Hand zu bekommen … Genug, die Zeit kommt, wo
man über Politik umlernen wird.’
44.  See note 35. This is a development from Heidegger’s claim in a speech at the annual matricula-
tion ceremony — when for the only time in his 10-month tenure as rector of Freiburg University he
received the new students with the kitsch enthusiasm of a new convert — that students are not to
be bourgeois but genuine workers, taking their place in the new Germany, because ‘the National
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take power over the claim to justice, as the concealment of the metaphysics of
valuation. Only something of a truly planetary scale could attain this — some-
thing, let us say, like the drive to save the planet itself. Nihilism on a planetary
scale could appear exactly as the drive to set a new value on the planet as such
and as a whole, with the legitimating force of incriminating everyone who fails
to cooperate with the task at hand — a totalitarian goal nevertheless entirely
exculpated from all accusations of totalitarian motive because of its sheer
urgency and necessity. Not to be seen to be saving the planet, even at the most
trivial (let alone grandiose) level, is to be guilty of collaborating in the planet’s
destruction.
In what way is this drive itself part of the metaphysics of subjectivity, as the
“jointure of beings” (Fügung des Seienden)? Now every thing to be valued is at
one and the same time devalued — separated from the manner and place of its
appearing, from the world and being through being made a thing that can be
valuable at all, even if its value is devaluation as such — and then ascribed a
value which comes from no beyond, from no transcendent one, even if it is an
event of transcending. The ascription of value is an event of subjectivity, it is the
enactment of the intersubjective: it is not drawn off from the already-given unity
of being (as the unity of the nothing which lets the world emerge in its plurifor-
mity), rather it attains to unity constantly, and produces the drive to unity as its
constant and ultimate goal. Valuations are in and of themselves relations, the
relations of rulership, power, and command, even as they mask themselves as
claims to justice. They arise from the powering-up of power itself, and in the iron
logic of the values and positions they enforce, they do this best as necessities, as
claims to the ascription of freedom.
Precisely because every ascription of a value denounces the thing in itself and
superimposes on it the value it is to have, nihilism internalises and normalises
every deviant claim to value “other than”, to value differently. There is no
escape from the logic of valuation — yet worse, the more creative and subversive
the valuation, the more it is suborned and put to use in the evaluative work and
task. Subjectivity is to be secured, therefore, precisely by relations of difference
as relations of valuation. Every attempt at a more radical revaluation — at resis-
tance, subversion, transformation, more radical change — is itself a necessary
part of the very activity of valuation as the activity of the self-securing of the
security of the subject. The iron necessity that requires the endless production
of values appears as the euphoric, triumphant freedom that the will can claim to
make them. The actual value matters not a whit; that there is value is all that
matters.
The securing of the subjectivity of the subject therefore turns out to be, not
generalised revolution, but the continued, justified, and legitimised assertion of
the subject in its claims to be secured through an overcoming inherent in all
social relations as the very establishment and prior possibility of those relations.
What begins in the overthrow of God, of feudal lords, of kings and bourgeois
alike, continues as a leap-frogging, somersaulting process of the continued





























an elite by the securing of the correction of injustice in privileging the underpriv-
ileged. Who are the underprivileged? They are precisely those who have yet to
attain to their new value. (To become a victim — of what, it does not matter —
is precisely to assert one’s claim and right to superiority and triumph!) What does
all this look like, and how does it appear in the contemporary political situation?
It is something remarkably like contemporary (world) democracy, in fact. It is
something that exactly explains the word “somersault” in its place at the begin-
ning of this article. Heidegger’s judgement on Jünger and Nietzsche is itself
uncomfortable, leaving open the question of where Heidegger thought all this
would lead. In his seminar preparation, Heidegger notes in relation to Jünger’s
glorying in Nietzsche’s revaluation of all values that Jünger contents himself with
being “head-over-heels” for these new values which are the instantiation of
Nietzsche’s will to power; head-over-heels with an assent which is nothing other
than, Heidegger says, a “messing around” with it all (Heidegger 2004b, p. 91).45
The thinker leaps over his interlocutor with a final, explanatory word.
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